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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

PEPPERIDGE FARM, INC.,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 16655

THE BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, INDUSTRIAL
COMMISSION OF UTAH; JOHN I. JOHNSON;
and AUSTIN C. NOLISHA,
Defendants.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pursuant to Section
35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, for the purpose of judicial review
of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, reversing the
decision of an Appeal Referee, and allowing benefits to two claimants, John I. Johnson
and Austin C. Nolisa, on the grounds the claimants had left work voluntarily, but with
good cause.
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DISPOSITION BELOW
Defendants-claimants, John I. Johnson and Austin C. Nolisa filed claims'
unemployment benefits effective December 17, 1978. A representative of the Depi•
ment of Employment Security found that the claimants left work voluntarily, bui'li
good cause and benefits were allowed. Plaintiffs appealed the allowance of benelrl•
an Appeal Referee who reversed the decision of the Department Representative 0,.1,

I

denied benefits to the claimants for6 (six) weeks, from December 17, 1978, toJanuarl
27, 1979, pursuant to Section 35-4-5( a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. r 1
established an overpayment in the amount of $738.00 for each of the clarmar.'
pursuant to Section 35-4-6(e), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. Clarman·

I

appealed the decision of the Appeal Referee to the Board of Review of the lnduslr1:.
Commission of Utah and the Board of Review reversed the decision of the Appe: i

Refecee, allowed benet;ts to the claimants to' the weeks in question ood

"''"'"''I

overpayments of $738.00 for each claimant, in decisions numbered 79-A-209. 79-BP

I

31, and 79-A-210, 79-BR-30, respectively. In both decisions two membersoftheBoar:I
of Review voted to reverse the decision of the Appeal Referee and one memberollhe
I

Board of Review dissented. On July 18, 1979, Plaintiff petitioned the Board of Rev1ewt: ·
reconsider its prior decisions and requested oral argument. Plaintiff's petitionwa'

I

denied by a unanimous Board of Review on August 7, 1979.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
. .
·
h. hallowed I
Plaintiff seeks reversal of the dec1s1ons of the Board of Review w ic
j
benefits to the claimants and petitions the Court to determine that the claimantswer·
.
.
.
t bl"shment ol thf
ineligible to receive benefits for the week in question and rees a 1
.
f the decisions or
overpayments in the amount of $738.00.Defendants seek affrrmance 0

I

the Board of Review.

2
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,

l.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants Board of Review, Department of Employment Security, and the
Industrial Commission of Utah substantially agree with the Statement of Facts set forth
in Plaintiff's brief, except in the following particulars to wit:
Defendant, Austin C. Nolisa, began work for Plaintiff on May 20, 1976, (R.00090,
R00124) or May 10, 1976. (R.00122)

Defendant, John I. Johnson, began work for

Plaintiff on June 23, 1976, (R.00090, R.00123), or June 28, 1976. (R.00121)
The reclassification of jobs which occurred in September, 1976, (R.00068, R.00072,
compare R .00038) affected seven (7) positions, (R .00097) which were to be filled on the
basis of seniority pursuant to the employer's personnel policy. (R.00098) However,
neither Defendant Johnson nor Defendant Nolisa, hereinafter referred to as claimants,
both of whom had sufficient seniority to qualify for the reclassified positions (R.00068,
R.00072) and both of whom are Black, (R.00068, R.00072) were given an opportunity to
bid for the new job classification. (R.00098, R.00099)
Claimants Johnson and Nolisa requested reevaluation of their positions and
pursued their complaints concerning the reclassification with management for
approximately one and a half years, until the claimant Nolisa was told by his area
manager that if he did not like it he could leave. (R.00097) Thereafter claimants
Johnson and Nolisa filed discrimination complaints with the Anti-Discrimination
Division of the Industrial Commission of Utah on August 29, 1978. (R.00108) After
reporting to work on that same day, claimants Johnson and Nolisa were placed on a
disciplinary suspension. (Plaintiff's Brief, page 4, R.00069, R.00072)
Between August 29, 1978, and September 9, 1978, claimant Johnson was given
additional work assignments he had not previously received, was made the subject of

3

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

supervisory complaints not previously received, and was accused of interfering with
production. (R.00068, R.00069)
When claimant Nolisa returned to work after his suspension he was assigned
tedious and/or dangerous jobs, which assignments had not previously been given to
members of the general sanitation crew, was ordered to clean out an oven while it was
still in operation, and was generally hindered by other employees in completing his
work assignments. (R.00073) Claimant Nolisa was also accused of deliberately
sabotaging production. (R.00073)
On September 9, 1978, both Nolisa and Johnson tendered their resignations.
(R.00117, R.00118) after which the additional assignments and accusations were
discontinued. (R.00069, R.00074)
At the time claimants Johnson and Nolisa filed their claims for unemployment
benefits the local Job Service office sent a letter to Plaintiff advising of the claims The
local office also telephoned the employer's place of business on two occasions and left
a telephone number for a return call. When the employer failed to respond, the local
office issued a decision allowing benefits based on the information available. (R.00115,
R.00116) The employer subsequently appealed to the Appeal Referee.

ARGUMENT
POINTI
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL
AFFIRM THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE
SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
·
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases 1s
we 11 established

Section 35-4-10(i), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part:
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In any. ju.dicial proceedings under this section the findings of the
Comm1ss1on and the Boa.rd of Review as to the facts if supported by
evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said Court shall be
confined to questions of law.
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commission and
the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be disturbed. Martinez v.
Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). In analyzing the above referenced

review provision, this Court has stated:
Under Section 35-4-10(i) the role of this Court is to sustain the
determination of the Board of Review unless the record clearly and
persuasively proves the action of the Board was arbitrary, capricious,
and unreasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law, the determination
was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion could be drawn from
the facts. Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729.
POINT II
SECTION 35-4-5(a), UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953, AS AMENDED, IS
INTENDED TO DISQUALIFY FROM THE RECEIPT OF UNEMPLOYMENT
BENEFITS ONLY THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE UNEMPLOYED BY
REASON OF THEIR OWN FAULT.
Section 35-4-5(a), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, provides:
35-4-5

An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for purposes of
establishing a waiting period:
(a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good
cause, if so found by the commission, and for not less than one or
more than the five next following weeks, as determined by the
commission according to the circumstances in each case, provided
that when such individual has had no bona fide employment
between the week in which he voluntarily left such work without
good cause and the week in which he filed for benefits he shall be so
disqualified for the week in which he filed for benefits and for not
less than one or more than the five next following weeks.

Plaintiff quotes Section 35-4-5(a) as amended by the 1979 legislature. However,
the applicable version of Section 5(a) is that quoted above, as it was constituted prior to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the effective date of the 1979 amendments. This being by reason of the facts thattht
claimants' quit occurred in September, 1978, the claims were filed in December,

1971
and the issues were adjudicated in January, 1979, all prior to the effective date of the
1979 amendments.
This Court has previously held that the purpose of the Employment Security Act,
to assist a worker and his family in times when he is out of work without fault on his part

Kennecott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Secunty, IJ

U. 2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987 (1962); and that the Department is to determine a claimant:
eligibility for unemployment compensation by adhering to the volitional test. Ola:
Nelson Construction Company v. The Industrial Commission, 121 U. 521, 243 P.2d951

(1952); Mills v. Gronning, (Utah, 1978) 581 P. 2d 1334.
However, a claimant voluntarily leaving work with good cause is in fact unem·
ployed without fault. This Court explained the reason for the good cause exception in
the following terms:
"What is 'good cause' must reflect the underl"ing purpose of the Act to
relieve against the distress of involuntary unemployment. The seeming
paradox of allowing benefits to an individual whose unemployment is of
his own volition disappears when the context of the words is viewed in
that light. The legislature contemplated that when an individual voluntarily leaves a job under the pressure of circumstances which may
reasonably be viewed as having compelled him to do so, the termination
of his employment is involuntary for the purposes of the Act. In statutory
contemplation he can not then reasonably be judged as free to stay at
the job ... " Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of
Utah, (Utah, 1977) 567 P. 2d 626, 630; Krauss v. M. Karagheusian, Inc.
13 N.J. 447, 100 A. 2d 277, 286 (1953).
The Court further explained "good cause" was limited to those instances where the
unemployment was caused by external pressures so compelling a reasonable prudent
person, exercising ordinary common sense and prudence. would be justified in
quitting under similar circumstances. Mills v. Gronning, SUPRA.
In the instant case the claimants voluntarily quit their employment, but under
. d in Point Ill
circumstances constituting good cause, as shall be more fully exp Iaine
hereof.

6
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The cases cited by plaintiff with regard to the disqualification of individuals who
quit work to attend school are substantially correct and the defendants agree with the
pr1nc1ple ennunciated within those cases. This Court has held on two occasions that
attendance at school is disqualifing unless one of the statutory exemptions is met.
Norton v. Department of Employment Security, 22 U. 2d 24, 447 P. 2d 907 (1968);
Townsend v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission, 27 U. 2d 94, 493 P. 2d 614

(1972). However, claimants did not quit work for the purpose of attending school, as is
explained in detail in Point 111 hereof, and did meet the statutory exemption of having
earned the major portion of their base period wages while attending school, (R.00119,
R.00120) as provided in Section 35-4-5(g), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended.

POINT Ill
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN DETERMINING THAT CLAIMANTS HEREIN HAD GOOD CAUSE FOR LEAVING WORK.
Plaintiff has contended throughout the appeal process that the claimants left work
1n order to attend school. The claimants contend, on the other hand, that they were
compelled to leave work when acts of discrimination against them intensified after they
filed a discrimination complaint. Thus, the issue before the Court is whether the
evidence of record supports the findings of the Board of Review that the problems the
claimants had been experiencing during the sixteen months prior to their separation
began to intensify after August 29, 1978, the date on which they filed their discrimination complaint, until claimants were no longer able to perform their jobs without
conflicts with their lead workers and supervisors.
The initial determination of good cause for voluntarily leaving work is a mixed
question of law and fact to be made by the administrative agency; the claimant has the

iJ," rlen of showing good cause; and he must indicate an effort to work out the pr<;>blems
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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unless he can demonstrate that such efforts would be futile. Denby v.

aoard of Revrei·

,

of the Industrial Commission of Utah, SUPRA.

For sixteen months the claimants attempted to resolve their concern aboutaiot
reclassification initiated by the employer. (R.00068, R.00072, R 00095, Rooogo
R.00097) The Plaintiff states in his petition for reconsideration to the Board of Reviev.
(R .00021) that no formal grievance was filed by the claimants and refers to the Plainlill;
grievance procedure. Yet, that very grievance procedure is couched in languageo'
discussing problems, and does not require or even suggest that a formal grievance 11
required. (R.00025)
Plaintiff's personnel manager states in his affidavit" ... There was never a complain:

1

of discrimination or any adverse response to work assignment ... " until after lhe :
claimants were suspended by the employer. (R.00039) Yet, claimant Nolisa testified
"Yes. I have something to say. Uh, according to the plant policy and the rules
(inaudible) there were seven vacant positions they created by reassessing the
jobs. And among these seven positions, I have the most seniority among the
people who that was suppose to get the job. I was supposed to get a job. They
didn't tell me these jobs were, these jobs were open. They just filled them and
when I questioned why that happened, they told me my, my area manager told
me that they had given the job to the people they thought were able to do the
job. And then I asked, 'How, do you determine who is able and who is not able?'
He said that some jobs need .. uh .. some sort of education or degree. I said, 'I
have a B.S. degree. That most people who is working on that line, none of them
have attended a college. Then, you think I can not do the job and they are the
people who can do it?' Then, he didn't give me any answer. Second time, he is.
second time I went in again because I was the only person willing to discuss
with the management, I went in again and he told me the production manager
told me, 'If you don't like what happening, you have been fighting this for ayear
and six months, and if you don't like it, you can leave.' "
In the face of such testimony, supported by overwhelming evidence as referencea
,
t and four.c
above, the Board of Review reasonably rejected the employers statemen
the claimants had in fact pursued a grievance for approximately sixteen months.

8
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without success. Finally, they filed their discrimination complaints with the Industrial
Commission. The merits of those discrimination complaints are not at issue herein.
What 1s pertinent to the instant case is the fact that the evidence of record is abundant
and convincing that after the claimants filed their discrimination complaints conditions
deteriorated to the point the claimants were finally compelled to leave work.
On August 29, 1978, the claimants filed the above mentioned discrimination
complaints. Inasmuch as the claimants worked the afternoon shift (R.00097, R.00099) it
may be assumed that the complaints were filed before the claimants reported to work.
Claimant Nolisa stated in his affidavit the events that followed in this manner.
"On the very day that John Johnson and I filed our racial discrimination claim
against Pepperidge Farm, I was called to the office of the plant manager. He
said, 'After all we have done for you this is what you are trying to pay us back
with.' He then suspended me ... " (R.00072)
The claimants were thereupon suspended from work as a disciplinary measure.
The claimants also specifically stated under oath that after filing their complaints
the supervisors made alterations in claimant Johnson's work assignment which
required accessive overtime; additional work assignments were given which had not
previously been required of Johnson; Johnson's supervisors began to follow him
around complaining that assignments were being done inadequately, which was
previously not done; and Johnson was accused of interfering with production.
(R 00068, R.00069) Upon tendering his resignation, the problems alleged by Johnson
ended. (R.00069)
Claimant Nolisa stated that after returning to work from being on suspension he
was given tedious yet dangerous jobs which had not previously been assigned to the
general sanitation crew; he was directed to enter and clean a baking oven while in

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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operation on three separate occasions, although such had not been previous!,
required; he was assigned to collect plant garbage, which assignment had nv
previously been given to anyone else in his section; other workers intentional,,!
hindered him in completing his work assignments and management did not respondt
this interference; parts were removed from his car while in the plant parking lot:andri',
was accused of deliberately sabotaging production. (R.00073)

Upon tenderingn

,
1

resignation the problems charged by claimant Nolisa no longer occurred. (R.00074!
In response to the foregoing specific charges by the claimants, the Plain!il'
submitted the hearsay statement, under oath, of the personnel manager who didw
have personal knowledge of any of the incidents charged, but who did makeagener; I
denial based on an investigation conducted by him. Under such circumstancesJfl
Board of Review could consider the specific direct statments under oath of lri

I

claimants to be more credible than the hearsay statements under oath madeb,

I

Plaintiff's personnel manager.

I

In light of the facts recited above, it is obvious that the claimants' commentsonlht

11

day of their suspension with regard to returning to school were statements made in
exasperation at the manner in which they were being treated and did not constitulel~i
actual reason for their quit. This conclusion is supported by the fact that both claimant~·
attended school during most of the time they were employed by Plaintiff. (R.000

91

R.00119, R.00120) t n fact, claimant Johnson stated that his continued employmentwai
s compelled 10
the only means by which he was able to attend school, and t h at he wa
.

.

temporarily withdraw from school when he lost his JOb.

(R 00069)

·

Under sue''

.
!

,

circumstances the Board of Review properly concluded that claimants did notquit!heir [
employment in order to attend school.

10
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In a case very similar to the instant matter, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
allowed benefits to a Black claimant who quit his job because of verbal abuse due to his
race After determining that incidents of racially derogatory remarks may constitute
good cause, the Court held:
Applying these principles to the instant case, we are convinced that appellant
has sustained his burden of showing that his termination of employment was
with cause of a necessitous and compelling nature by demonstrating that his
conduct was consistent with ordinary common sense and prudence, and that
the circumstances prompting the severance of the employment were substantial. Appellant and his witnesses testified to several instances in which he was
subjected to verbal abuse because of his race. Such verbal abuse was a
continuing occurrence throughout appellant's three year employment at
Victor's Restaurant. The continuing racial tension created by such abuse
caused appellant repeated humiliation and apprehension. These reactions
were not merely whims, nor were they caused by any overly sensitive
emotional condition on appellant's part. The humiliation and apprehension
were emotions grounded in reality and were substantial burdens placed upon
appellant's ability to perform his job. The degrading and abusive effects of the
repeated expressions of racial prejudice were cumulative in nature and
ultimately created an employment condition which would have been intolerable to any reasonable person in similar circumstances. The record establishes that appellant left his job after suffering through three years of such
repeated incidents of racial prejudice and verbal abuse ... The termination was
with cause of a necessitous and compelling nature and appellant should not
have been denied compensation. Taylor v. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 474 Pa. 351, 378 A. 2d 829 (1977).
The parallels with the instant matter are obvious. Claimants Johnson and Nolisa
attempted for sixteen months to resolve a racial grievance. When they finally filed their
discrimination complaints with the Industrial Commission they were immediately
suspended and thereafter were mistreated by supervision and their co-workers until it
was no longer possible to carry out their work assignments. They thereupon quit by
tendering their resignations on September 9, 1978. (R.00117, R.00118) The Board of
Review correctly concluded that such circumstances were compelling and constituted
good cause as defined by this Court in Denby v. Board of Review of the Industrial
Commission of Utah, SUPRA.

11
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CONCLUSION
The evidence in support of the decision of the Board of Review is both compelen·
and substantial. The decisions allowing benefits to the claimants and setting asidelhc
overpayments of $738.00 for each should, therefore, be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this _ _ day of November, 1979.

ROBERT B. HANSEN,
Attorney General

FLOYD G. ASTIN
K. ALLAN ZABEL
Special Assistants
Attorney General

BY:---------~-

K. Allan Zabel
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two copies of the foregoing Defendant's
Brief to M. Byron Fisher, Daniel W. Anderson, Attorneys for Plaintiff, Fabian &
Clendenin, 800 Continental Bank Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84101, this _ _ day
of November, 1979.

K. Allan Zabel
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